

Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria: Rethinking Counter-Insurgency Strategies

Olumide Olumuyiwa Omodunbi¹, Oyinlola Abodunrin²,
Oluwadamilare Segun Olawole³ & Adebawale Idowu Adeyeye⁴

*Department of Political Science, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)^{1,3,4},
Department of Peace and Conflict studies, Osun State University (Osogbo, Nigeria)²;*
[*olumide.omodunbi@uniosun.edu.ng*](mailto:olumide.omodunbi@uniosun.edu.ng)¹, [*Oyinlola.abodunrin@uniosun.edu.ng*](mailto:Oyinlola.abodunrin@uniosun.edu.ng)²
[*Olawoleoluwadamilare4@gmail.com*](mailto:Olawoleoluwadamilare4@gmail.com)³, [*Adebawale.adeyeye@uniosun.edu.ng*](mailto:Adebawale.adeyeye@uniosun.edu.ng)⁴
070343933360, 07032884255, 08062481252, 08035784744

Abstract

Nigeria has continued to witness strained civil-military relations as a result of authoritarian legacies, human rights violations and lack of trust between security agencies and civilians. These strained relationships have impacted the effectiveness of counter-insurgency efforts in the fight against banditry, Boko-Haram insurgents and other internal security issues. Using secondary sources of data and relying on the Objective Control theory, the article examined the role of civil-military relations in counter-insurgency strategies and their impact on military-civilian cooperation, public trust, and security outcomes. The study revealed that issues such as excessive force, absence of community engagement and weak civilian oversight have continued to contribute to resentment amongst the populace and undermined successes of the military in counter-insurgency operations. The article concludes that there must be a shift from the military-centric approach to a community-based security model driven by intelligence, participation, inter-agency collaboration and respect for human rights which will bring about a more accountable, transparent and people-centered security framework in Nigeria.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Counter-Insurgency, Boko Haram, Human Rights, Military

Introduction

Nigeria has persistently experienced tense civil-military relations, stemming from a legacy of authoritarian governance, pervasive human rights abuses, and a profound mistrust between security forces and the civilians. Since independence and under decades of military rule, the military played two roles; as the keeper of territorial integrity and as the most manifest powerful political force. This has left behind legacies of authoritarianism, poorly functioning democratic institutions, and a widespread mistrust between civilians and the military (Huntington, 1957; Fawole, 2003). These legacies still affect modern counter-insurgency efforts, primarily against Boko-Haram in the northeast, but also rising banditry, communal conflicts, and kidnapping in the northwest and north-central regions in Nigeria. (Campbell & Harwood, 2018). Insecurity is still a concern even after years of military campaigns, and these have raised some concerns on the militarized strategies of the Nigerian government in the context of weak civil-military relationships.

The military mode of operation has tended to focus on excessive force. However, claims of random attacks, arbitrary arrests, civilian property destruction, and other human rights violations have weakened its legitimacy and estranged communities (Amnesty International, 2020; Onapajo, 2017). Instead of fostering collaboration and trust, these practices provide propaganda to insurgents, which create a cycle of violence and mistrust. It is important to note that the focus of civil-military relations is on the use of coercive power and legitimacy in asymmetric warfare control, but in Nigeria, poor governance, poverty, ethno-religious divisions and poor social contract between the state and the society contribute to such tension (Feaver, 2003; Cohen, 2016).

According to (Kilcullen, 2010; Omeje & Mwangi, 2020) it has been noted that victory in the battlefield is not all that is needed when it comes to the success in counter-insurgency engagements. Real success lies on the involvement of local communities in security policy, building trust, and accountability and civilian oversight. Of course, when state agencies fail to provide services to society, insurgent organizations capitalize on dissatisfaction through provision of rudimentary welfare services or ideological accounts that appeal to marginalized groups (Akinola & Uzodike, 2018). The dependency on coercion without simultaneous governance reforms thus further threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the state.

In addition, the dynamic security situation in Nigeria is an example of the ineffectiveness of traditional military theories. Boko Haram no longer seeks to occupy territory but carries out decentralized guerrilla warfare through suicide bombings and civilian infrastructure attacks (Zenn, 2020). Meanwhile, bandit gangs work via cross-border criminal organizations, which take part in cattle rustling, arms smuggling, and cooperation with other rebels (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014). Such hybrid threats confuse the boundaries between terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime and require an adaptive and intelligence-led approach that encourages inter-agency efforts and active involvement of civilians.

Militarization of the civilian space has eroded democratic rule as well. Emergencies and long-term security operations tend to limit human rights, destabilize the people, and cause people to lose their trust in governmental bodies (Olaniyan & Uzodike, 2020). Militarized counter-insurgency without strong civilian controls threatens to institutionalize dictatorial habits in the name of security. Therefore, scholars and practitioners (Abiodun, 2021; Lafont, 2020) tend to support a paradigm shift to people-centered approaches that priorities human rights, transparency, and democratic accountability.

This paper therefore argues that deepening civil-military relations is a democratic requirement besides the strategic necessity. The security issues facing Nigeria require that counter-insurgency be recalibrated to embed community-based, legitimacy-based approaches as an alternative to a state-centered, militarized approach. In order to overcome an insurgency and other internal security threats and establish sustainable peace in Nigeria, collaboration, accountability and people-centered governance should be of core essence to the country.

Literature Review

The research on civil-military relations has traditionally examined the association between military forces, non-military governing structures, and populations in times of war and peace. Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) have set the arguments on autonomy and control of the military. Subsequent theories such as Feaver agency model (2003) and Cohen wartime leadership analysis (2016) focused on accountability, supervision and professionalism. Scholarly discussions on Africa trace fragile civil-military relations to colonial legacies, prolonged military rule, and weak institutional frameworks (Luckham, 1995; Welch, 1987). This pattern is evident in Nigeria, where the military historically functioned not only as a security institution but also as a political actor. This dual role shaped governance structures and continues to influence contemporary security management and civil-military relations in the country.

Civil-military relations in Nigeria are characterized by the rocky political past of the country. Since 1966, the armed forces were institutionalized in the military regimes in terms of security as well as an economic and administrative form of government (Fawole, 2003; Siollun, 2009). This created a situation where the military is viewed as being important to national unity but mistrusted due to tendencies of authoritarianism. According to Adebawo and Obadare (2010), such duality is a hindrance to the democratic consolidation, especially when the military takes control of the internal security processes. This tension is evident in the counter-insurgency campaigns wherein the use of excessive force is against the democratic rule of accountability and human rights. Classical theories of counter insurgency point to the fact that the victory in asymmetric warfare should be based not on the firepower but on the legitimacy and collaboration of civilians. Galula (1964) and Thompson (1966) emphasized on the need to win hearts and minds, and Kilcullen (2010) asserted that counter insurgency needed to be people-driven, involving the local actors and taking care of civilians. The failure to observe these principles results in alienation and repetition of violence as experienced in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka (Metz, 2014;

Hashim, 2013). These lessons echo in Nigeria, whereby militarist reactions tend to dominate community engagement and governance changes.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

This paper adopts Objective Control Theory of Civil–Military Relations as its theoretical framework of analysis. The theory was propounded by Samuel P. Huntington (1957) and explains how stable civil–military relations can be achieved through a clear division of roles between civilian authorities and the military. The theory assumes that effective civilian control is best ensured when the military is granted autonomy within its professional domain, while civilians retain authority over security policy formulation and national objectives. It further assumes that military professionalism promotes political neutrality, reduces politicization, and enhances operational efficiency. Conversely, excessive civilian interference or weak civilian oversight undermines professionalism and erodes democratic accountability.

Applied to the Nigerian context, the theory helps explain how decades of military dictatorship weakened military professionalism and blurred the boundary between civilian authority and military responsibility. This imbalance has fostered mistrust, politicization of the armed forces, and weak democratic oversight, thereby reducing the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations.

In Nigeria’s counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram and armed banditry, excessive reliance on military force has overshadowed non-kinetic strategies such as intelligence gathering, communication, and community engagement. Weak civilian control has also contributed to allegations of human rights abuses and the misuse of force. From the perspective of Objective Control Theory, this structural imbalance undermines genuine professionalism and effective civilian supremacy (Daily Trust, 2025). The study applies this theory to assess how the quality of civil–military relations influence the legitimacy and efficiency of counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria. It argues that sustainable security outcomes require institutional reforms that strengthen civilian oversight, preserve military autonomy within professional limits, promote transparency, and encourage community-based and intelligence-driven operations consistent with democratic ideals.

Methodology

The paper adopted a qualitative research design, where data were sourced from secondary sources such as books, academic journals, media reports, policy documents, and publications of international and civil society organizations in examining the relationship between civil–military relations and counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria. To enhance the credibility of the findings and minimize bias, data from official, academic, and civil society sources were triangulated. The study focuses on Nigeria’s democratic era (1999–2024), with particular reference to counter-insurgency efforts against Boko Haram in the North-East and armed banditry in the North-West.

Rethinking Counter-Insurgency and Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria

Civil-military relations and the counter insurgency failure are interrelated as it can be seen through the lens of the Boko Haram insurgency. As an extremist Islamist movement, Boko Haram went violent in 2009 after confrontations between the group and the security forces and the assassination of its leader Mohammed Yusuf (Higazi, 2015; Zenn, 2020). Researchers associate its growth with the heavy-handed policies of the state, violation of human rights, and devastation of communities (Onapajo, 2017; Amnesty International, 2020). These forms of coercion aggravated resentment to the point that Boko Haram was able to make itself the advocate of the disadvantaged. The lack of good collaboration between civilians and security forces detrimentally affected intelligence gathering (Agbibo, 2013; Pereuse de Montclos, 2014), and it demonstrates that the deficiency in civil-military credibility weakens the results of counter insurgency.

The same trends are traced throughout the Nigerian security crises such as the Niger Delta militancy, communal violence, and banditry. The heavy-handed approach used by the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta aggravated the anti-state feelings and it took the Amnesty Programme of 2009 to give a political response (Ikelegbe, 2010). Airstrikes and raids that result in the killing of civilians have been a source of protest and mistrust in the northwest

(International Crisis Group, 2021). According to (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014), unless such root causes as poverty, corruption, and poor governance are addressed, military campaigns will not lead to sustainable peace (Akinola and Uzodike, 2018).

Historical Legacies and Civil-Military Tensions

One of the most significant findings of this study is that the present counter-insurgency issues that Nigeria is facing cannot be isolated without reference to the historical context of the military authoritative regimes in this nation. Between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria experienced a series of military regimes which entrenched the command-and-control culture within the state apparatus. During this time, the military controlled the government directly and simultaneously took control of security operations, and military professionalism became more of a blurred line between the military and the civilians in terms of authority and control. This legacy has produced an institutional behavior that persists to date in the democratic era and created tensions that subvert contemporary counter-insurgency strategies.

It was expected that the reversion to civilian rule in 1999 would entrench democratic control of the armed forces. However, as witnessed, civilian institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary have scarcely been in a position to exercise any significant check. This is a weakness which shows the inability and political reluctance to deal with the military, which remains one of the most influential players in the Nigerian politics. Based on this, the counter-insurgency strategy is militarized in nature with the elected leaders typically giving the military wide scope discretion. This display of strength lends credence to (Huntington, 1957), who posits that inefficiency is the consequence of the obscured lines between civilian authority and military autonomy because neither will be able to find the balance that will grant them the legitimacy and professionalism they need.

According to field reports reviewed in the framework of the current paper, counter-insurgency operations against Boko-Haram in the northeast were initially characterized almost exclusively by military language, with little emphasis on governance and developmental actions. This was a result of institutional hegemony of Nigeria's authoritarian past, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, when the military was frequently used for domestic security purposes with little consideration for human rights or community roles.

Mistrust between the military and civilians has also resulted from this historical legacy. Security forces in conflict situations are still generally viewed with suspicion by the local communities, who remember the military dictatorship that ruled for decades. This mistrust destroys any form of cooperation that is vital in a counter-insurgency environment where information and civil aid is invaluable. Cohen (2016) also asserted that weak cultures of civilian control often fail to create the trust required to build the efficient security government. This is especially evident in the case of Nigeria due to the mistrust that runs deep as the citizens who would have been valuable assets in intelligence acquisition tend to run away in instances of military actions.

Human Rights Violation

Among the key findings of this paper is the fact that the security agencies of the Nigerian government have never upheld human rights, which has diminished the ability of Nigeria to combat insurgence. Amnesty International (2020) reported sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, killings and destruction of civilian property in the northeast. Such activities have marginalized the civilian groups as opposed to sidelining Boko-Haram insurgents, a fact that has caused the development of distrusts and hatred towards the government. The key center of gravity in counter-insurgency theory is legitimacy; once the latter is lost, it is extremely difficult to recover (Kilcullen, 2010). These abuses also cripple such notions that justify insurgency as seen in the harsh methods employed in Nigeria.

International Crisis Group (2021) asserted that many residents of the states of Borno and Yobe have been on the receiving end of indiscriminate violence, as a result of military raids in the majority of situations, whole villages have been held to blame with no necessity on the supposed cooperation with rebels. This form of collective punishment promotes the notion that the military considers the local communities as its adversaries instead of considering them as a security ally. The same result can be found through Kaldor (1999) who argues that the existence of contemporary conflicts thrives in the conditions when governments perceive the individuals within

their own nations as threats, and it nourishes the spiraling of violence. This back and forth has been particularly devastating in northeast Nigeria where communities have been caught in the middle of Boko-Haram and the military and have been more inclined to distrust both sides.

Crisis of legitimacy is not a one-sided action, which is only applied to the battlefield but on the treatment of prisoners. Thousands of suspected Boko-Haram members have been detained without trial, many of them women and children, and in most cases, they are in inhumane conditions (Amnesty International, 2020). The unwarranted process does not only deny the citizens their basic rights, but also provides the insurgents with quality propaganda materials. Boko-Haram has used these abuses many times in order to appear as a champion of the oppressed Muslims against the state, thus gaining recruits eager to join the group not necessarily because of its ideology but rather due to grievances. Results also indicate that military responses can increase violence rather than reduce it. For example, during the Zaria massacre in December 2015, the Nigerian Army killed hundreds of members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), an incident that has continued to damage public trust in security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Amnesty International, 2016). Although the IMN is not related to Boko Haram, such events illustrate broader patterns of distrust between civilians and the military.

Weak Intelligence and Community Engagement

The results show that the counter-insurgency methods in Nigeria are still characterized by ineffective intelligence work and negative relations with communities. Actionable intelligence is essential as a counter-insurgency tool, which is frequently obtained via solid local networks (Kilcullen, 2010). Nonetheless, a culture of distrust between citizens and security agencies in Nigeria has paralyzed the intelligence gathering process. In areas such as Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, citizens hardly cooperate with the security agencies as they fear being attacked by insurgents and the military (International Crisis Group, 2021). Those civilians who are willing to collaborate face the possibility of collective punishment or being attacked by insurgents, which results in a culture of silence and fear undermining the security agenda.

Despite the fact that in the past, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) represented a promise of community-military collaboration, the experiences of abuse, and the uncertain nature of its position between the civil society and military frameworks have destroyed the level of trust among the locals. The rivalry between the military, police, and the intelligence units further undermines the organization of the process and results in missed opportunities. Furthermore, programmes such as the Operation Safe Corridor are not popular among the citizens since the society does not feel included in the peacebuilding process and perceives these programmes as giving insurgents a reward. All in all, the counter-insurgency failures in Nigeria are based not merely on the tactical failures but also on the inability to trust and cooperate effectively. Intelligence-led operations can only be sustained through the rebuilding of civilian confidence.

Civilian Oversight and Democratic Accountability

Civilian control and democratic accountability are critical for effective civil-military relations. Studies have shown that weak civilian oversight and limited institutional capacity contribute to impunity and undermine the effectiveness of security operations (Huntington, 1957; Luckham, 1995; Welch, 1987). In Nigeria, democratic institutions including the legislature, judiciary, civil society, and the press are often unable to monitor the security sector effectively. Parliamentary oversight is limited, internal disciplinary measures lack transparency, and civil society and media actors face legal and political constraints that weaken their watchdog role (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Amnesty International, 2016).

The consequences are significant. Poor accountability normalizes abusive practices, reduces public trust in security initiatives, and diminishes community cooperation in counter-insurgency efforts. Strengthening parliamentary defense committees, empowering independent ombudsman offices, and establishing community-based complaint mechanisms can enhance transparency and restore confidence in security institutions.

Furthermore, the professionalization of the military through the integration of human-rights principles, training, and civilian involvement is essential. However, such reforms depend heavily on political will. Senior military and

political leaders must resist partisan misuse of the armed forces and publicly commit to accountability. Without robust supervision, institutional reforms, and ethical governance, counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria risk remaining marked by impunity and citizen mistrust.

Developmental Gaps and Structural Violence

The study notes that anti-insurgency policies have failed to focus on the structural factors of insecurity and especially on poverty, marginalization, and unequal development in Nigeria. Based on the structural violence theory by Galtung (1969), which asserts that the lack of good governance, unemployment, low level education, and poor infrastructure, particularly in the North-East, forms a good breeding ground to extremism. More than forty percent of the population of Nigerians are below poverty line, with the North being the most impacted (UNDP, 2021). Insurgent groups take advantage of deprivation as they promise identity, justice and crude welfare (Campbell & Harwood, 2018).

Inequality is increased by too much attention to military spending which exceeds one trillion naira (₦1 trillion) per year at the expense of investment in education and health. Trust is undermined also by corruption and political alienation since diversion of humanitarian and security funds eradicating state legitimacy. The humanitarian crisis, which created renewed radicalization, is also caused by the displacement of more than three million people by the crisis.

Experience in Colombia and Kenya has demonstrated that sustainable counter insurgency must be pegged on development as well as inclusion. Nigeria needs to institutionalize good governance, strengthen the local authorities, and combine livelihood, education and infrastructure programmes in its security policy. Developmental neglect has continued to be a type of structural violence perpetrating conflict and therefore, to ensure long term peace and successful counter-insurgency in Nigeria it is necessary to tackle socio-economic inequities.

Role of Inter-Agency Collaboration and Intelligence Sharing

The study found out that one of the biggest gaps in the counter-insurgency policy of Nigeria is the absence of proper inter-agency coordination and intelligence sharing. Counter insurgency involves the cooperation between the police, intelligence and armed forces but individualism, role conflict and institutional competition sabotage combined efforts. Fragile intelligence systems have slowed down the fight against Boko Haram and other insurgents since the various intelligence agencies like the DSS, Police and Armed Forces operate in secrecy, not sharing information and missing opportunities to thwart attacks (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

Resource and recognition competition between different institutions undermines morale and productivity as well as lack of coordination has led to friendly-fire cases and civilian deaths. Such collapses reveal vulnerabilities which are used by insurgents. A successful counter-insurgency process as evidenced in the United States after the 9/11 attacks and the Kenyan war on Al-Shabaab requires combined intelligence networks and collective responsibility.

Nigeria should establish trust between the agencies, coordination, and technological innovation as an institution. The flow of information can be improved with modern surveillance tools, data analytics and digital communication provided with training, funding and interoperability reforms. Intelligence based on the community is also essential, because the civilians develop the first sense of suspicious activities. An integrated, intelligence-led counter-insurgency system requires strengthening community trust and protection, and combined command system and joint training.

Toward a People-Centered Counter-Insurgency Approach

The findings indicated that Nigeria needs to change from a military-oriented to a people-oriented counter-insurgency model. An insurgency will not only prosper on violence but also on grievances, injustice and poor governance. The concept of sustainable counter insurgency hence relies on the involvement of the community, safeguarding of human rights, and restoring confidence between civilians and security forces.

People-centered approach considers civilians as active partners rather than passive recipients who receive security. Communities have essential intelligence and local knowledge that are needed in operations. The experience of other nations, such as Colombia or the Philippines, shows that local peace committees, dialogue forums, and all-inclusive governance can increase resilience to insurgent influence and these lessons can be learned to help Nigeria strengthen the cooperation between citizens and security forces

The most important detail about the people-centered security model is strong human-rights protection. Therefore, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial murders and use of force despite justification have undermined the trust of the people and contributed to the propaganda of insurgents. Rebuilding the credibility presupposes responsibility of the abuses and the incorporation of human-rights education into military activities (Osadare and Olagunju, 2025; Akanni, 2019). In fact, compliance with the international humanitarian law (IHL) will increase legitimacy by protecting the civilian population (Osadare & Olagunju, 2025; Ugwu, 2024).

Economic empowerment should be added to military actions beyond security. The social economic factors contributing towards insurgency like poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy require solutions through the establishment of youth training and creating of employment, as well as organized development programs. It is observed that poverty and unemployment are very strong underlying factors behind insurgency in Nigeria. (Safli institute, 2014; Chidozie et al., 2024). The development gap that contributes to insecurity could be closed by strengthening institutions like North-East Development Commission and making them accountable (Safli Institute, 2014).

In addition, collaboration with the civil society, traditional leaders, and humanitarian actors takes center stage. It is crucial to establish the development of mutual trust via integrated intelligence forums, civil-military activities, and community policing. Strategic communication should also be emphasized in order to refute extremist narratives, to emphasize the victories of the government, and to increase the message of inclusion and peace (Chidozie et al., 2024). The people-centered security paradigm is an essential paradigm shift in the counter-insurgency approach of Nigeria instead of the reactive militarism, this liberal approach focuses on civilian protection, human rights, socioeconomic development, institutional collaboration, and proper communication. This course of action is more sustainable towards peace and legitimacy.

Conclusion

This study has analyzed the civil-military relations in Nigeria and its effects on counter-insurgency. It concludes that the insecurity is not only due to groups such as Boko Haram, bandits, but also due to structural factors such as the legacies of authoritarianism, weak institutions, human-right violations and mistrust between the civilians and the military. The lack of proper civilian control and the neglect of development, combined with an authoritarian style of the military, has restricted the efficiency of state reactions, which have become a source of resentment, helped to legitimize the extremist discourse, and undermined trust.

The study emphasizes that a shift should be introduced as a militarized model should be replaced by people-centered approach focusing on civilian safety, human rights, inclusiveness, and socio-economic development. It is proven that force will not provide the success, but counter-insurgency will have to be built on the trust of people, on consideration of grievances, and responsibility. The experiences of Colombia, Kenya and South Africa have demonstrated that combining security responses with development and governance reforms have greater effect compared to military approaches. The paper recommended the following, firstly, the Nigerian government ought to enhance civilian control and accountability through empowering parliamentary defense committees, transparency in discipline and facilitating independent ombudsman unions and community complaints system. The paper also recommends that the media and the civil society should be safeguarded to play the effective watchdog role without political influences. Security forces are to be professional and human-right observant, and they should be trained on international humanitarian law and protection of civilians. The military and police operations should adopt accountability and ethical behaviors. The security forces should also embrace people-centered counter-insurgency approach which involves a blend of community engagement, intelligence sharing as well as developmental interventions. Insurgency can be mitigated through socio-economic programs, empowering

young people and working together with civil society and traditional leaders to ensure that grievances exacerbate insurgency. It is imperative to counter extremist narratives through strategic communication, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of inclusion, civilian protection, and effective governance.

References

- Abiodun, T. F. (2021). Untold impacts of Nigeria's land borders closure policy on border communities, economy, and security in West African sub-region. *International Journal of Research in Education and Sustainable Development*, 1(1), 1–12.
- Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2010). *Encountering the Nigerian state*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). The Nigerian burden: Religious identity, conflict and the current terrorism of Boko Haram. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 13(1), 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.764680>
- Aghedo, I., & Osumah, O. (2014). Insurgency in Nigeria: A comparative study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram uprisings. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 49(1), 38–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909612470007>
- Akinola, A. O., & Uzodike, U. O. (2018). Boko Haram terrorism and counter-terrorism: The Nigerian experience. *African Security Review*, 27(2), 100–118. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1477270>
- Akanni, N. K. (2019). Counter insurgency and human rights violations in Nigeria. *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization*, 85, 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.7176/JLPG/85-02>
- Amnesty International. (2020). Nigeria: “We dried our tears”: Addressing the toll on children of Northeast Nigeria’s conflict. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/2068/2020/en/>
- Campbell, J., & Harwood, A. (2018). *Nigeria: What everyone needs to know*. Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, E. A. (2016). *Supreme command: Soldiers, statesmen, and leadership in wartime* (Updated ed.). Simon & Schuster.
- Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Chambers, P., & Wolf, S. O. (2013). *Democracy under stress: Civil-military relations in South and Southeast Asia*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Davis, J., & Jinadu, A. (2020). Civil-military cooperation and counter-insurgency in Nigeria. *African Security Review*, 29(3), 280–298. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2020.1805352>
- Fawole, W. A. (2003). *Nigeria's external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966–1999*. Obafemi Awolowo University Press.
- Feaver, P. (2003). *Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations*. Harvard University Press.
- Hashim, A. S. (2013). *When counterinsurgency wins: Sri Lanka's defeat of the Tamil Tigers*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Higazi, A. (2015). Mobilisation into and against Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria. In M. Cahen, E. Chabal, & N. T. Bhaba (Eds.), *Africa: The politics of belonging* (pp. 305–328). Brill.
- Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Harvard University Press.
- Ikelegbe, A. (2010). Oil, resource conflicts and the post-conflict transition in the Niger Delta region: Beyond the amnesty. *Journal of Peace building & Development*, 6(2), 19–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2010.615306>
- International Crisis Group. (2021). *Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling back the mayhem* (Africa Report No. 288). <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem>
- Kilcullen, D. (2010). *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford University Press.
- Lafont, C. (2020). *Democracy without shortcuts: A participatory conception of deliberative democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Luckham, R. (1995). Dilemmas of military disengagement and democratization in Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 26(2), 49–61. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1995.mp26002005.x>
- Metz, S. (2014). Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35(1), 26–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.892887>
- Nwabachili, C. O., & Ngwu, G. E. (2024). Appraisal of the challenges of implementation and enforcement of International Humanitarian Law rules in Nigeria both in times of peace and war. *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of Human Rights Law*, 1(1), 1–18.

- Nwankpa, M. (2021). Civilian Joint Task Force and the legitimacy of counter-insurgency in Nigeria. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 32(6–7), 1175–1198. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1912887>
- Olaniyan, A. O., & Uzodike, U. O. (2020). When two elephant's fights: Insurgency, counter-insurgency and environmental sufferings in Northeastern Nigeria. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 39(3), 437–453. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2020.1726988>
- Omeje, K., & Mwangi, O. G. (2020). Business of crime and conflicts: Emerging dynamics in Africa. *African Security Review*, 29(2), 131–151. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2020.1745205>
- Onapajo, H. (2017). The Boko Haram insurgency and the politics of counterterrorism: A critique. *African Security*, 10(2), 87–110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2017.1329407>
- Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014). Boko Haram and politics: From insurgency to terrorism (Working Paper No. 123). African Studies Centre. <https://www.ascleiden.nl/publications/boko-haram-and-politics>
- Siollun, M. (2009). *Oil, politics and violence: Nigeria's military coup culture (1966–1976)*. Algora Publishing.
- United Nations Development Programme. (2021). *Human development report 2021/2022: Uncertain times, unsettled lives*. <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22>
- Ugwu, M. O. (2024). Protection of victims of armed conflict vis-à-vis vulnerable groups through respect for the rules of international humanitarian law in Nigeria: An appraisal. *International Journal of Comparative Law and Legal Philosophy*, 1(1), 1–15.
- Welch, C. E., Jr. (1987). The military and the state in Africa: Problems of political transition. In Z. Ergas (Ed.), *The African state in transition* (pp. 191–215). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zenn, J. (2020). *Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring global jihad in Nigeria*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.